The federal government spends billions of taxpayer dollars on technology every year. But a troubling question is emerging from government audits: Does Washington actually know how much of the software it purchases is being used?

At the Department of Veterans Affairs, the answer remains far from reassuring.

The agency planned to spend approximately $985 million on software during fiscal year 2025, including commercial software licenses. Yet federal investigators have documented significant weaknesses in the department’s ability to track those licenses, manage purchases and identify potential savings.

The findings raise serious questions about government spending at an agency responsible for providing medical care, benefits and other essential services to millions of American veterans.

In a July 2026 report, the Government Accountability Office examined the VA’s enterprise software asset management program, an initiative established in 2023 to bring greater oversight to software purchasing throughout the department.

The program was intended to address a fundamental problem. Different VA offices had historically purchased software independently, making it difficult to maintain a complete picture of what the department owned, needed or was already paying for.

A centralized inventory could help identify unnecessary purchases, overlapping subscriptions and opportunities to negotiate better contracts.

But auditors found the program had not fully implemented important management practices.

Of six areas examined, the VA had minimally implemented strategic alignment, change management and software license management practices. Its governance framework had not been implemented at all.

The department also struggled with planning and oversight of the centralized software inventory project.

Those weaknesses matter because software licensing is not necessarily a one-time expense. Government agencies may enter multiyear agreements, pay recurring subscription fees or purchase access for thousands of employees.

Without reliable information about actual usage, officials can struggle to determine whether they have purchased too many licenses or too few.

Federal auditors had identified that problem years earlier.

A January 2024 review found that the VA was not adequately tracking the number of licenses in use or regularly comparing its inventories against purchasing records.

The department agreed to recommendations intended to correct those deficiencies.

By March 2026, VA officials were reporting plans to begin implementing centralized inventory functionality. However, auditors continued to identify shortcomings in the broader management effort.

The July report also noted that turnover in the VA’s information technology leadership had complicated oversight, including the absence of a permanent chief information officer since January 2025.

The problem extends beyond one department.

In June 2026, another federal audit examined cloud computing procurement across 24 major agencies.

Officials from 17 agencies reported challenges managing cloud costs. Those difficulties included tracking expenses after moving systems into cloud environments and managing billing information from multiple providers.

Cloud services can improve efficiency, but their pricing structures also create financial risks when agencies cannot accurately monitor consumption.

For taxpayers, the central concern is straightforward.

If government departments cannot reliably determine what software they possess, what they are using and what they are paying for, how can they confidently demonstrate that purchases represent the best use of public money?

The VA audit does not establish that its entire software budget was wasted. Nor does it identify a verified dollar amount spent on unused licenses.

That distinction is important. A documented oversight failure is not the same thing as proven financial misconduct.

Nevertheless, the inability to identify unnecessary spending can itself become expensive, particularly when purchasing decisions involve hundreds of millions of dollars.

There is also a question of accountability.

The VA has acknowledged the need for improvements and undertaken efforts to centralize its software management. But taxpayers deserve to know whether those reforms have produced measurable results.

How many licenses have been identified as unnecessary? How many contracts have been renegotiated? How much money has actually been saved?

And perhaps most importantly, can the department now demonstrate that the software it purchases is being used?

Those are questions that require updated records and direct answers from the agency.

The issue is not whether government employees need modern technology. They unquestionably do.

The issue is whether federal agencies have established the financial controls necessary to ensure that taxpayer-funded technology purchases are justified, monitored and periodically reviewed.

For an agency entrusted with serving America’s veterans, every avoidable expense represents money that could potentially support other priorities.

The federal government has repeatedly promised greater efficiency and accountability. The VA’s software management problems provide a concrete opportunity to test whether those promises are producing results.

Until officials can provide reliable usage figures, contract details and documented savings, the full financial consequences of these longstanding weaknesses will remain unknown.